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The No Cloning Theorem versus the Second Law of Thermodynamics
Gavriel Segre∗
Asher Peres’ proof that a violation of the No Cloning Theorem would imply a violation of the
Second Law of Thermodynamics is shown not to take into account the algorithmic-information’s
contribution to the Thermodynamical Entropy of the semi-permeable membranes of Peres’ engine.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a , 05.30 , 03.65.-w
I. INTRODUCTION
Two results have changed, in the last two decades, our
way of looking at the Foundation of Quantum Mechan-
ics: the No-Cloning Theorem (by Dieks, Wooters and
Zurek [1], [2]) and the comprehension of the algorithmic-
information’s contribution to the thermodynamical en-
tropy in presence of Mawxell’s demons (by Landauer,
Bennett and Zurek [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]).
The No-cloning theorem, stating the impossibility
of building a quantum gate able to clone two non-
orthogonal states, would seem to have no connection with
Quantum Thermodynamics; that this is not the case,
anyway, is implied by its equivalence with the Theorem
of Indistinguishability for nonorthogonal states lying at
the heart of the irreducibility of Quantum Information
Theory to the classical one.
In [9] (as well as in the 9th chapter of his wonderful
book [1]) Asher Peres claims that the Theorem of Indis-
tinguishability for nonorthogonal states is necessary in
order of preserving the Second Law of Thermodynamics;
his proof of this statement is based on the analysis of
a cyclic thermodynamical engine in which some ”magic”
semi-permeable membranes, assumed ad absurdum to be
able to distinguish nonorthogonal states, are used in a
suitable way in order of lowering the Universe’s entropy.
As we will show, anyway, such a proof is not cor-
rect, since it doesn’t take into account the Landauer-
Bennett- Zurek’s results on Mawxell’s demon, that im-
ply that also the algorithmic-information of Peres’ semi-
permeable membrane contribute to the thermodynamical
entropy, preventing the Second Principle to be violated.
This consideration, already presented in the re-
mark7.3.10 of my PHD-thesis [10], is here extensively
analyzed.
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II. NO-CLONING THEOREM AND
INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF
NONORTHOGONAL STATES
Let us us consider a quantum gate Uˆ with two input
edges and two outputs edges such that there exist a nor-
malized start state |s > and two distinct vectors |ψ1 >
and |ψ2 > such that:
Uˆ |ψ1 > |s > = |ψ1 > |ψ1 > (2.1)
and:
Uˆ |ψ2 > |s > = |ψ2 > |ψ2 > (2.2)
Taking the inner product of eq.2.1 and eq.2.2 one obtains
the equation:
< ψ1|ψ2 >2 = < ψ1|ψ2 > (2.3)
from which it follows that
< ψ1|ψ2 >= 0 (2.4)
The No-Cloning Theorem, stating the impossibility of a
device able of cloning two nonorthogonal states, is then
proved.
Let us now consider a different situation in which Alice
codifies her answer to Bob’s marriage proposal sending
him one of two possible states |ψ1 > and |ψ2 > (with the
previously concorded rule that |ψ1 > means yes while
|ψ2 > means no). To know Alice’s answer, Bob makes
on the received state the measurement described by the
positive-operator-valued-measure {Mˆj}2j=1 with outcome
j. Depending on the outcome on the measurement Bob
tries to guess what the index i was using some rule i =
f(j), where f(·) represents the rule he uses to make the
guess.
We will know prove the Theorem of Indistinguishabil-
ity of Nonorthogonal States stating that if |ψ1 > and
|ψ2 > are nonorthogonal it follows that Bob cannot infer
if Alice has accepted his marriage proposal.
Introduced the operators:
Eˆi :=
∑
j:f(j)=i
Mˆ
†
j Mˆj (2.5)
the condition that Bob can infer Alice’s answer may be
formalized by the constraint:
< ψi|Eˆi|ψi > = 1 i = 1, 2 (2.6)
2Since
∑
i Eˆi = I it follows that
∑
i < ψ1|Eˆi|ψ1 > =
1; assuming the distinguishability condition of eq.2.6 it
follows that < ψ1|Eˆ2|ψ1 > = 0 and thus:√
Eˆ2|ψ1 > = 0 (2.7)
Let us now suppose ad absurdum that < ψ1|ψ2 > 6= 0.
It follows that there exist a state |ψ⊥ > and two com-
plex numbers α and β such that:
|ψ2 > = α|ψ1 > + β|ψ⊥ > (2.8)
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1 (2.9)
|β| < 1 (2.10)
< ψ1|ψ⊥ > = 0 (2.11)
Conseguentially:√
Eˆ2|ψ2 > = β
√
Eˆ2|ψ⊥ > (2.12)
and hence:
< ψ2|Eˆ2|ψ2 > = |β|2 < ψ⊥|Eˆ2|ψ⊥ >
≤ |β|2
∑
i
< ψ⊥|Eˆi|ψ⊥ > = |β|2 < 1 (2.13)
which contradicts the absurdum hypothesis.
Beside their apparent diversity, the No-Cloning
Theorem and the Theorem of Indistinguishability of
Nonorthogonal States may be easily proved to be equiv-
alent:
if Bob was able to distinguish the two nonorthogonal
states |ψ1 > , |ψ2 > Alice used to answer his marriage
proposal, he could clone them by making the measure-
ment distinguishing them and making at will multiple
copies of the state Alice had given him.
Contrary, if the non-orthogonal states |ψ1 > , |ψ2 >
were clonable, Bob could easily distinguish them by
cloning them reapetedly in order of obtaining the states
|ψ1 >
⊗
n , |ψ2 >
⊗
n whose inner product tends to zero
when n → ∞ and are, conseguentially, asymptotically
distinguishable by projective measurements.
III. BENNETT’S THEOREM ON MAXWELL’S
DEMONS IN CLASSICAL THERMODYNAMICS
Almost all the greatest physicists of the last two cen-
turies has, at some point, fought against one of the deep-
est problems of Thermodynamics: Maxwell’s demon.
Let us introduce it with Maxwell’s own words:
”One of the best extablished facts in thermodynamics is
that it is impossible in a system enclosed in an envelope
which permits neither change of volume nor passage of
heat, and in which both the temperature and the
pressure are everywhere the same, to produce any
inequality of temperature or of pressure without the
expenditure of work. This is the second law of
thermodynamics, and it is undoubtedly true as long as
we can deal with bodies only in mass, and have no
power of perceiving or handling the separate molecules
of which they are made up. But if we conceive a being
whose faculties are so sharpened that he can follow
every molecule in its course, such a being, whose
attributes are still as essentially finite as our own,
would be able to do what is at present impossible to us.
For we have seen that the molecules in a vessel full of
air at uniform temperature are moving with velocities by
no means uniform, though the mean velocity of any
great number of them, arbitrary selected, is almost
exactly uniform. Now let us suppose that such a vessel
is divided in two portions, A and B, by a division in
which there is a small hall, and that a being, who can
see the individual molecules, opens and closes this hole
so as to allow only the lower ones to pass from B to A.
He will see, thus, without expenditure of work, raise the
temperature of B and lower that of A, in contradiction
with the second law of thermodynamics”; cited from the
last but one section ”Limitation of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics” of the 22th chapter of [11]
In the 220 years after the publication of Maxwell’s book
an enormous literature tried to exorcize Maxwell’s demon
in different ways; an historical review may be found in
the first chapter ”Overview” as well as in the ”Chrono-
logical Bibliography with Annotations and Selected Quo-
tations” of the wonderful books edited by Harvey S. Leff
and Andrew F. Rex [12] , [13].
All these exorcisms were based on the idea that, to
accomplish his task, Maxwell’s demon necessarily causes
a thermodynamical-entropy’s raising causing the Second
Law to be preserved:
they anyway strongly differed in identifying the ele-
ment of the demon’s dynamical evolution which is nec-
essarily thermodinamically-irreversible:
coming to recent times, most of the Scientific Com-
munity (not only of Physics: cfr. e.g. the third chapter
”Maxwell’s Demons” of [14]) strongly believed in Leon
Brillouin’s exorcism [15], identifying such an element in
the demon’s information-acquisition’s process.
When anyone thought that the ”The-end” script had at
last appeared to conclude ”The Exorcist” movie, Charles
H. Bennett showed in 1982 [4], [5], [16], basing on the
previous work by Rolf Landauer on the Thermodynamics
of Computation [3], that:
1. Maxwell’s Demon was still alive owing to the
nullity of Brillouin’s exorcism: the demon’s ac-
quisition process may be done in a completelly
thermodynamically-reversible way
2. the necessarily-thermodinamically-irreversible ele-
ment is instead demon’s information-erasure’s pro-
cess
The corner-stone of the Themodynamics of Computa-
tion is Landauer’s Principle:
3in this framework an arbitrary function is called
logically-reversible if it is injective while it is called
thermodynamically-reversible if there exist a physical de-
vice computing it in a thermodynamically-reversible way;
Landauer’s Principle states the equivalence of logical-
reversibility and thermodynamical-reversibility.
An immediate consequence of Landauer’s Principle is
that the erasure of information is thermodynamically-
irreversible:
to prove it, it is sufficient to observe that to
any logically-irreversible function one may associate a
logically-reversible function different from the original
one in that the output is augmented by some of the in-
put’s information (usually called garbage); assuming ad
absurdum that garbage’s erasure is thermodynamically-
reversible, it would then follow that the original function
would be thermodynamically-reversible too, contradict-
ing the hypothesis.
We can at last introduce Bennett’s exorcism of
Maxwell’s demon: conceptually Maxwell’s demon may
be formalized as a computer that:
1. gets the input (s, v) from a device measuring both
the side s from which the molecule arrives and its
velocity
2. computes a certain semaphore-function (s, v)
p→
p[(s, v)] giving as output a 1 if the molecule must be
left to pass while gives as output a 0 if the molecule
must be stopped:
specifically, the semaphore-function may be defined
through the following Mathematica expression [17]:
p[s− , v−] := If [s = Left , If [v ≤ vT , 0 , 1] ,
If [v > vT , 0 , 1]] (3.1)
where vT is a fixed threshold velocity
3. gives the output p[(s,v)] to a suitable device that
operates on the molecule in the specified way
Both the first and the third phases of this process, taking
into account also the involved devices, may be made in a
thermodinamically-reversible way.
As to the second step, anyway, let us observe that
the semaphore-function p is logically-irreversible and
hence, by Landauer’s Principle, also thermodinamically-
irreversible.
As above specified, such a thermodinamically-
irreversibility may be avoided conserving the garbage;
let us, precisely, suppose, that the demon-computer
computes the thermodynamically-reversibly-computable
function p˜:
p˜[s− , v−] := If [s = Left ,
If [v ≤ vT , ((s , v) , 0) , ((s , v) , 1)] ,
If [v > vT , ((s , v) , 1) , ((s , v) , 0)]] (3.2)
Let us suppose to make the demon-computer operate
n times on n different molecules.
When n grows the demon, with no expenditure of work,
raises the temperature of B and lowers that of A.
But let us now analyze more carefully Clausius’s for-
mulation of the Second Principle: it states that no ther-
modynamical transformation is possible that has as its
only result the passage of heat from a body at lower tem-
perature to a body at higher temperature.
In the above process the passage of heat from A to
B is not the only result: another result is the storage
in the demon-computer’s memory of the n-ple of inputs
((s1, v1) , · · · , (sn, vn)).
To make the passage of heat from A to B to become the
only result of the process we could think that the demon,
at the end, erases his memory; but this, as we have seen,
cannot be done in a thermodynamically-reversible way:
such an erasure causes an increase of entropy that may
be proved to be greater than or equal to the entropy-
decrease produced by the passage of heat from A to B.
Bennett’s exorcism of Maxwell’s demon, has, anyway,
a far reaching conseguence; supposed that the gas is de-
scribed by the thermodynamical ensemble (X , P ), let us
introduce the Bennett’s entropy of P:
SBennett(P ) := H(P ) + I(P ) (3.3)
where:
H(P ) := < − log2 P > (3.4)
is Shannon’s entropy of the distribution P (i.e. its Gibbs’
entropy in thermodynamical language), while:
I(P ) :=
{
min{|x| : U(x) = P} if ∃x : U(x) = P ,
+∞ otherwise.
(3.5)
is its prefix-algorithmic-information (denoted simply
as algorithmic information form here and beyond),
i.e. the length of the shortest program computing it on
the fixed Chaitin universal computer U (demanding to
[18] for details we recall that a Chaitin universal com-
puter is a universal computer with prefix-free halting set
and the property that, up to an input-independent addi-
tive constant, it describes algorithmically any output in
a way more concise that any other computer).
Bennett’s exorcism of Mawxell’s Demon implies Ben-
nett’s Theorem stating that the thermodynamical en-
tropy of the ensemble (X , P ) is equal to to its Bennett’s
entropy:
Stherm(P ) = SBennett(P ) 6= H(P ) (3.6)
To understand why Bennett’s exorcism implies eq.3.6
let us consider some example:
let us suppose, for simplicity, that the initial equilib-
rium probability distribution is such that the molecules
have one of only two possible velocities vL and vH , re-
spectively lower and higher than the threshold velocity
4vT
vL < vT < vH (3.7)
Let us start from the case in which:
P (v = vL) = P (v = vT ) =
1
2
(3.8)
Supposing that the demon memorizes in the cbit xn
the value of the semaphore function of the nth molecule
that he observes, we have that, at the beginning, the
string ~xn := x1 · · ·xn seems to increase its length in an
algorithmically-random way, i.e. in a way such that, in-
formally speaking 1:
I(~xn) ≈ n (3.9)
As the distribution of the molecules becomes more and
more disuniform, with the slow molecules accumulating
on the left side and the speed molecules accumulating
on the right side (i.e. when the temperature’s difference
among the two sides arises), the probability distribution
of xn becomes more and more unfair preferring for xn =
0, so that the string ~xn increases its deviation from Borel-
normality.
Such an increasing regularity of xn corresponds to the
fact that its algorithmic-information becomes to increase
more and more slowly.
Reasoning in terms of a finite number N of molecules
2, after a certain number nord of measurements made by
the demon, the system reaches the state in which all the
slow molecules are on the left side of the vessel, while all
the speed molecules are on the right side; from that point
further the demon stops every molecule so that:
xn = 0 ∀n > nord (3.10)
At this point, in which the demon has completed its task
of lowering the probabilistic information of the gas
so that such a probabilistic information ceases to de-
crease, the algorithmic information of the string ~xn
ceases to increase:
I(~xn) = I(~xnord) ∀n > nord (3.11)
The whole process may, conseguentially, be seen as a
transfer of information from the gas to demon’s memory
in which an amount of gas’ probabilistic information
is transferred to the demon as algorithmic informa-
tion.
1 the sign ≈ of ”rough-equality” may be formalizied more precisely
by the condition that the l.r.h. grows at least as quicker than the
r.h.s. so that eq.3.9 may be rigorously considered as as a different
way of stating Chaitin’s condition limn→∞I(~xn) − n = +∞
2 This must be considered only as an artifice to clarify the argu-
ment, since one has to remember that the thermodynamical limit
N → ∞ has to be taken at the end; the qualitative behaviour
here described becomes, in this limit, an asymptotic one
Let us now consider the case in which the initial dis-
tribution of molecules’ velocities is unfair:
P (v = vL) = 1− α (3.12)
P (v = vH) = α (3.13)
where α 6= 12 .
The qualitative behaviour of the process is analogous
to the previously discussed one although the greater is
the difference |α − 12 | the littler is the amount of gas’
probabilistic information converted into algorithmic
information.
Now, as we have already stressed, the involved thermo-
dynamical process doesn’t violate the Second Principle of
Thermodynamics since the passage of heat from the low-
temperatures-source A to the high-temperature-source B
is not the only result: an other result is the memorization
in demon’s memory of the sequence {xn}.
Such a memorization, that as we have seen is a trans-
fer of information from the gas to the demon as well as
a transfer of a portion of the overall information of the
Universe from probabilistic to algorithmic form, cor-
responds to an accumulation in algorithmic form of
useful-energy (i.e. of energy that may be transformed
in work), i.e. in an accumulation of thermodynamical-
entropy in algorithmic-form that has to be counted in
the Universe’s overall thermodynamical balance prevent-
ing, indeed, the Second Principle to be violated.
IV. THERMODYNAMICAL ENTROPY,
STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND THE
KOLMOGOROVIAN FOUNDATION OF
INFORMATION THEORY
Despite Richard Feynman’s strongly authoritative
acclamation of the Landauer-Bennett’s results on
Maxwell’s Demons (cfr. the section5.1.1 ”Maxwell’s De-
mon and the Thermodynamics of Measurement” of [16])
and its appreciation by Nobel prize awarded theoretical
physicists such as Murray Gell-Mann (cfr. e.g. the 15th
chapter ”Time’s arrows” of [19]), these, and in particular
Bennett’s Theorem, are far from having being accepted
by the Theoretical Physics’ community.
The objections (implicitely or explicitely) moved to
Bennett’s Theorem are essentially the following:
1. the Mawxell-demon’s issue simply shows that the
Second Law has a statistical validity
2. the action of Mawxell’s demon moves the system
out of thermodynamical equilibrium: conseguen-
tially the thermodynamical entropy ceases to be
defined
3. the interdisciplinary attitude of Algorithmic
Physics is not necessary to understand Thermody-
namics
5The first objection, i.e. the claim that the Second Law
has only a statistical validity, is the κoινη´ as far as the
Mathematical-Physics’ literature is concerned.
Such a claim is, anyway, false:
though Statistical Mechanics (historically pioneered by
Maxwell, Thomson and Boltzmann: cfr. e.g. the chap.3-
7 of [20]) allows to obtain the Equilibrium Thermody-
namics of a macroscopic thermodynamical system deriv-
ing it from a probabilistic description of its underlying
microscopic dynamics, Thermodynamics is a perfectly
self-consistent physical theory predicting the value and
dynamical evolution of all the thermodynamical observ-
ables of thermodynamical systems, (generally not in ther-
modynamical equilibrium), with certainty. This occurs,
in particular, as to the Second Law of Thermodynamics
stating that in any thermodynamical cycle of any iso-
lated thermodynamical system (generally not in thermo-
dynamical equilibrium) one has with certainty that:∮
δQ
T
≤ 0 (4.1)
where δQ is heat’s amount absorbed by the system while
T is its temperature.
The source of the erroneous claim that Maxwell-
demon’s issue simply shows the statistical validity of the
Second Law may be understood in terms of the following
words by Joel Lebowitz:
”The various ensembles commonly used in statistical
mechanics are to be thought of as nothing more than
mathematical tools for describing behaviour which is
practically the same for ”almost all” individual
macroscopic systems in the ensemble. While these tools
can be very useful and some theorems that are proven
about them are very beautiful they must not be confused
with the real thing going in a single system. To do that
is to commit the scientific equivalent of idolatry, i.e.
substituting representative images for reality”; cited
from the Introduction of [21]
Such an idolatric attitude for which a thermodynami-
cal system is confused with its modellization trough Sta-
tistical Mechanics is, indeed, a typical mental attitude
of some Mathematical Physicists that had often induced
even authoritative scientists to assert trivially erroneous
statements of Thermodynamics; this is the case, for ex-
ample, of Giovanni Gallavotti’s analysis of brownian mo-
tors that, misunderstanding the celebrated analysis by
Richard Feynman of a ”ratchet and pawl heat engine”:
”Let us try to invent a device which will violate the
Second Law of Thermodynamics, that is a gadget which
will generate work from a heat reservoir with everything
at the same temperature. Let us say we have a box of
gas at a certain temperature, and inside there is a an
axes with vanes in it. · · · . Because of the bombardments
of gas molecules on the vane, the vane oscillates and
jiggles. All we have to do is to hook into the other end
of the axle a wheel which can turn only one way- the
ratchet and pawl. Then when the shaft tries to jiggle
one way, it will not turn, and when it jiggles the other,
it will turn. Then the wheel will slowly turn, and
perhaps we might even tie a flea onto a string hanging
from a drum on the shaft, and lift the flea! Now let us
ask if this is possible. According to Carnot’s hypothesis,
it is impossible. But is we just look at it we see, prima
facie, that it seems quite possible. So we must look more
closely”; cited from the chapter 46 of [22]
streghtens Jean Perrin’s restatement of the idolatric
claim that the Second Law has only a statistical validity:
”But is must be remembered · · · that the brownian
movement, which is a fact beyond dispute, provides an
experimental proof (deduced from the molecular
agitation hypothesis) by which of means Maxwell, Gibbs
and Boltzmann robbed Carnot’s Principle of its claim to
rank as an absolute truth and reduced it to the mere
expression of a very high probability”; cited from the
51th section ”The brownian movement and Carnot’s
Principle” of [23]
claiming that:
”It is important to keep in mind that here we are
somewhat stretching the validity of thermodynamics
laws: the above machines are very idealized objects, like
the daemon. They cannot be realized in any practical
way; one can arrange them to perform one cycle, · · ·
but what one needs to violate the second law is the
possibility of performing as many energy producing
cycles as required.Otherwise their existence ”only”
proves that the second law has only a statistical validity,
a fact that had been well establishes with the work of
Boltzmann. In fact an accurate analysis of the actual
possibility of building walls semipermeable to colloids
and of exhibiting macroscopic violation of the second
principle runs into grave difficulties: it is not possible to
realize a perpetual motion of the second kind by using
the properties of Brownian motion. It is possible to
obtain a single violation of Carnot’s law (or of a few of
them) of the type described by Perrin, but as time
elapses and the machine is left running, isolated and
subject to physical laws with no daemon or other
extraterrestrial being intervening (or performing work
accounted for), the violations (i.e. the energy produced
per cycle) vanish because the cycle will be necessarily
performed as many times in one direction (apparently
violating Carnot’s principle and producing work) as in
the opposite direction (using it). This is explained in an
analyis on Feynman, see [22] chapter 46, where the
semi-permeable wall is replaced by a wheel with an
anchor mechanism, a ”ratchet and a pawl”, allowing it
to rotate only in one direction under the impulses
communicated by the colloidal particle collisions with the
valves of a second wheel rigidly bound to the same axis.
Feynman’s analysis is really beatiful, and remarkable as
an example of how one can still say something
interesting on perpetual motion. It also brings important
6insight into the related so-called ”reversibility paradox”
(that microscopic dynamics generates an irreversible
macroscopic world).”; cited from the section8.1
”Brownian motion and Einstein’s Theory” of [24]
i.e. that a brownian motor can violate Carnot’s Law for
a few cycles, a thing that, if it was true (that unfortu-
nately this is not the case is shown, for example, in [25]),
would have allowed Gallavotti to definitively resolve the
energetic problem of the World saving it from the slavery
of oil.
The second objection (implicitely or explicitely) moved
to Bennett’s Theorem, namely that since the action of
Mawxell’s demon moves the system out of thermody-
namical equilibrium the thermodynamical entropy ceases
to be defined, is based again on the idolatric attitude
of making confusion between a thermodynamical system
and its modellization through Statistical Mechanics de-
nounced by Lebowitz:
the fact that there doesn’t exist a universally accepted
notion of entropy in Nonequilibrium Statistical Mechan-
ics is consequentually seen a synonimous of the false
statement that the notion of thermodynamical entropy
of a thermodynamical system not in equilibrium is not
defined.
Such a confusion appears, for example, in the following
passage by Gallavotti:
”One of the key notions in equilibrium statistical
mechanics is that of entropy; its extension is
surprisingly difficult, assuming that it really can be
extended. In fact we expect that, in a system that
reaches under forcing a stationary state, entropy is
produced at a costant rate, so that there is no way of
defining an entropy value for the system, except perhaps
by saying that its entropy is −∞. Although one should
keep in mind that there is no universally accepted notion
of entropy in systems out of equilibrium, even when in a
stationary state, we shall take the attitude that in a
stationary state only the entropy creation rate is
defined: the system entropy decreases indefinitely, but at
at costant rate. Defining ”entropy” and ”entropy
production” should be considered an open problem”;
cited from the section9.7 ”Entropy Generation. Time
Reversibility and Fluctuation Theorem. Experimental
Tests of the Chaotic Hypothesis” of [24]
or in the following passage by Olivier Penrose:
”Even in thermodynamics, where entropy is defined only
for equilibrium states, the definition of entropy can
depend on what problem we are interested in and on
what experimental techniques are available”; cited from
[26]
that is implicitly a kind of self-criticism as to the follow-
ing analysis of Mawxwell’s-demon:
”The large number of distinct observational states that
the Maxwell demon must have in order to make
significant entropy reductions possible may be thought of
as a large memory capacity in which the demon stores
the information about the system which he acquires as
he works reducing the entropy. As soon as the demon’s
memory is completelly filled, however, · · · he can
achieve no further reduction of the Boltzmann entropy.
He gains nothing for example, by deliberately forgetting
or erasing some of his stored information in order to
make more memory capacity available; for the erasure
being a setting process, itself increases the entropy by an
amount of at least as great as the entropy decrease made
possible by the newly available memory capacity”; cited
from [27]
in which, as it has been observed by Harvey S. Leff and
Andrew F. Rex in the 1th-chapter ”Overview” of their
wonderful book [12], Olivier Penrose arrived very near to
the right Bennett’s exorcism, though lacking to make the
final intellectual step to understand that erasure is the
fundamental act that saves Mawxell’s demon.
Let us now explicitely show how Lebowitz’s remark
against idolatry allows to confute the first objection to
Bennett’s Theorem, namely that the Second Law of
Thermodynamics has only statistical validity: let us ana-
lyze, at this purpose, the following pass in which Maxwell
himself explains what he wanted to show through the in-
troduction of his demon:
”This is only one of the instances in which conclusions
which we have drawn from our experience of bodies
consisting of an immense number of molecules may be
found not to be applicable to the more delicate
observations and experiments which we may suppose
made by one who can perceive and handle the individual
molecules which we deal with only in large masses. In
dealing with masses of matter, while we do not perceive
the individual molecules, we are compelled to adopt what
I have described as the statistical method of calculation,
and to abandon the strict dynamical method, in which
we follow every motion by the calculus. It would be
interesting to enquire how far those ideas about the
nature and method of science which have been derived
from examples of scientific investigation in which the
dynamical method is followed are applicable to our
actual knowledge of concrete things, which, as we have
seen, is of an essentially statistical nature, because no
one has yet discovered any practical method of tracing
the path of a molecule, or of identifying it at different
times.”; cited from the last but one section ”Limitation
of the Second Law of Thermodynamics” of the 22th
chapter of [11]
and the following pass by Thomson (later Lord Kelvin):
”’Dissipation of Energy’ follows in nature from the
fortuitous concourse of atoms. The lost motivity is
essentially not restorable otherwise than by an agency
dealing with individual atoms”; cited from [28]
They don’t say that the Second Principle of Thermo-
dynamics have only a statistical validity, but a differ-
7ent thing: that the usual link existing between such a
principle (that, not falling in the idolatry denounced by
Lebowitz, one have to remember to have an its own valid-
ity in Thermodynamics) and Statistical Mechanics have
to be modified as soon as entitities able to handle indi-
vidual molecules are involved.
Having followed Lebowitz’s advise of not falling into
the idolatric attitude of making confusion among a
physical thermodynamical system and its modellization
through Statistical Mechanics and, hence, preserving us
from the error of confusing the difficulties involved in the
definition of entropy in Nonequilibrium Statistical Me-
chanics from the difficulties involved in defining entropy
in Nonequilibrium Thermodynamics, let us briefly recall
these latter:
given a thermodynamical system made of N different
species, the thermodynamical entropy of a thermody-
namical state X is defined as:
Stherm(X) :=
∫ X
REV
δQ
T
(4.2)
where the integral is over a thermodynamically-reversible
tranformation starting in a fixed reference thermodynam-
ical state O (to be ultimatively fixed by the Third Law of
Thermodynamics requiring that limT→0 Stherm(X) = 0)
and ending in the state X.
If X is a state of thermodynamical equilibrium the
thermodynamical entropy may be expressed as a func-
tion of the internal energy U, of the volume V and of the
number of moles of each contributing specie Nk:
X equilibrium state ⇒
Stherm(X) = Stherm[U(X) , V (X) , Nk(X)] (4.3)
If X is not a state of thermodynamical equilibrium, any-
way, its thermodynamical entropy cannot be expressed
anymore as a function of the internal energy U, of the
volume V and of the number of moles of each contribut-
ing specie Nk:
Xnonequilibrium state ⇒
Stherm(X) 6= Stherm[U(X) , V (X) , Nk(X)] (4.4)
This fact is often erroneously expressed as the claim that
thermodynamical entropy is not defined out of equilib-
rium: this is simply false, since the the operational defi-
nition of Stherm(X) through eq.4.2 continues to hold.
Simply one has, denoting with lower case letters the
(intensive) densities of (extensive) quantities, that the
equation eq.4.3 of Classical Thermodynamics must be
generalized by its expression in Generalized Thermody-
namics, having the form [29]:
stherm(X, t) = stherm[u(X, t) , v(X, t) , nk(X, t) ,
∇u(X, t) , ∇v(X, t) , ∇nk(X, t) ,
∇2u(X, t) , ∇2V (X, t) , ∇2nk(X, t), · · · ] (4.5)
and reducing to eq.4.3 in the equilibrium case.
Under conditions explicitely formalizable, furthermore,
the Local Equilibrium Condition, stating that the local
and istantaneous relations between the thermal and me-
chanical properties of a physical system are the same as
for a uniform system at equilibrium, holds. In this case
eq.4.5 reduces to:
stherm(X, t) = stherm[u(X, t) , v(X, t) , nk(X, t)] (4.6)
i.e.:
ds = (
∂s
∂u
)v,nk +(
∂s
∂v
)u,nk +
N∑
k=1
(
∂s
∂nk
)u,v,nk′ ( for k
′ 6= k)
(4.7)
Consequentially, if the one-parameter family of nonequi-
librium thermodynamical states Xt satisfy the Local-
Equilibrium Condition, one has that the temperature in
the point ~x of the system at time t may be simply ex-
pressed as:
T (Xt, ~x, t) = [(
∂s
∂u
)v,nk ]
−1 (4.8)
Returning at last to our Maxwell’s demon, let us observe
that its way of taking the whole thermodynamical sys-
tem out of the thermodynamical equilibrium satisfies the
conditions under which the Local-Equilibrium Condition
holds.
The third objection moved (implicitely or explicitely)
to Bennett’s Theorem, namely that the intedisciplinary
attitude of Algorithmic Physics is not necessary to un-
derstand Thermodynamics, is certainly the subtler one.
To analyze it, let us observe that the involved thermo-
dynamical system is the compound system Gas + De-
mon.
As a mechanical system such a compound system is a
classical dynamical system (Xcompound , Hcompound) with
phase space:
Xcompound := XGas
⋃
XDemon (4.9)
and hamiltonian:
Hcompound := HGas + HDemon + Hinteraction (4.10)
where HGas ∈ C∞(XGas), HDemon ∈ C∞(XDemon), and
Hinteraction ∈ C∞(Xcompound).
The mechanical description of the whole process is
defined by the Hamiltonian flow Tt : Xcompound →
Xcompound induced by Hamilton’s equation:
dx
dt
= {H , x} (4.11)
associating to any initial state x
(IN)
compound =
(x
(IN)
Gas , x
(IN)
Demon) ∈ Xcompound the final state
xOUT := limt→∞ TtxIN .
8The strategy of Statistical Mechanics would con-
sist in deriving the macroscopic thermodynamical vari-
ables of the thermodynamical system Gas+Demon as
properly-defined functions of a suitable statistical ensem-
ble (Xcompound , Pcompound).
The ensemble (X , P ) involved in the formulation of
Bennett’s Theorem, instead, doesn’t take into account
the demon: as we saw in the last section, it is the
equilibrium statistical ensemble (Xgas , Peq) that Statis-
tical Mechanics would associate to the dynamical system
(XGas , HGas), the underlying reason for that deriving
substantially from the Algorithmic Physics’ attitude, as
we will now explain.
Algorithmic Physics is, by definition, that discipline
analyzing physical processes looking at them as compu-
tational processes according to the following correspon-
dence’s table:
PHYSICAL PROCESS COMPUTATIONAL PROCESS
initial state input
dynamical evolution computation
final state output
and conseguentially applying the conceptual instru-
ments of Computation’s Theory.
Essentially owing to the overwhelming ”new age” folk-
lore by which it has been popularized in the divulga-
tive literature, the interdisciplinary nature of Algorith-
mic Physics is looked by many theoretical and mathe-
matical physicists with great mistrust; as a consequence,
also the beautiful and serious insight it has produced,
such as the investigations concerning the foundations
of Computational Physics (i.e. of the discipline study-
ing the computer-simulation of physical systems) such as
Stephen Wolfram’s notion of computational irreducibility
(i.e. the situation in which the faster way of predicting
the final state of a dynamical system of known laws-of
motion is to simulate its whole dynamical evolution and
to see what happens at the end) or his analyses concern-
ing the rule of Undecidability in Physics [30] 3 concretized
by the work of Chris Moore and many others [35], [36],
are ignored.
3 such as Wolfram’s professional path has been characterized by
his departure from academia in order of constituting Wolfram
Research Inc. producing Mathematica [17], his intellectual path
has been characterized by an analogous non-conformism that led
him to develop his seminal ideas culminating into a personal
conception of randomness and complexity radically different by
that of Algorithmic Information Theory [31] and based on what
he calls the Principle of Computational Equivalence; the inter-
relations existing among such a viewpoint and Algorithmic In-
formation Theory is analyzed in the first four sections ”Introduc-
tion”, ”What Perception and Analysis Do”, ”Defining the No-
tion of Randomness”, ”Defining Complexity” of the 10th chapter
”Processes of Perception and Analysis” and in the 12th chapter
”The Principle of Computational Equivalence” of [32], in the fi-
nal section ”Afterthoughts...” of the 7th chapter ”Mathematics
in the Third Millenium” of [33] and in the final section ”Final
remarks” of the 4th part ”Future Work” of [34]
The approach underlying Bennett’s Theorem is a par-
tial application of the Algorithmic Physics’ approach in
which not the whole hamiltonian flow Tt : Xcompound 7→
Xcompound is seen as a computational process, but only
its restriction as to the Demon Tt|XDemon : XDemon 7→
XDemon.
The dynamical evolution of the gas Tt|XGas : XGas 7→
XGas continues to be described through Mechanics, i.e.
owing to the enormous number of involved degrees of
freedom, through Statistical Mechanics.
The third objection to Bennett’s theorem is based on
the observation that such an (hybrid) recourse to Algo-
rithmic Physics is, at last, completelly avoidable:
why, for particular compound systems, should one to
give up the usual, traditional approach of Statistical Me-
chanics to derive the thermodynamical entropy in the
usual way from the partition function of a Gibbs’s ensem-
ble for the dynamical system (Xcompound , Hcompound)?
And which should be exactly these particular com-
pound systems?
A minimal answer to the last question is immediate:
those particular compound systems in which XDemon
and HDemon are such to result in the scattering pattern
that, looking at the demon with the eyes of Algorith-
mic Physics, corresponds to the computational-process of
computing the semaphore function p and making to pass
or to reflect the molecule correspondigly as described in
the last section; as we will see in the next section, any-
way, such a class of particular compound systems may be
considerably enlarged through a suitable characterization
of the notion of an intelligent system.
As to the former question, namely why for these com-
pound systems one should indeed to give up the usual
Statistical Mechanics’ approach, the answer is: simply
because it is simpler.
The third objection to Bennett’s Theorem is, with this
regard, correct: there is no necessity of adopting the hy-
brid Algorithmic-Physics’approach on which Bennett’s
Theorem is based on:
simply, given an arbitrary many-body physical system
like XGas, whenever its interaction with another physi-
cal systems gives rise to a scattering-cross-section dσ
dΩ of
the particular kind specified above, the usual Statistical
Mechanics’ approach, though still perfectly applicable,
is not the simpler approach since it doesn’t catch the
particular structural peculiarity of the analyzed system,
structural peculiarity that allows an alternative, more
concise, explication that, according to Occam’s Razor,
have conseguentially to be preferred.
Such a passage from a purely probabilistic approach
to a hybrid mix of two approaches, the probabilistic and
the algorithmic one, reflects itself in the the link between
Thermodynamics and Information Theory:
in terms of the three different approaches to the defi-
nition of information introduced by A.N. Kolmogorov in
his fundamental papers on the Foundation of Informa-
tion Theory [37] such a passage is exactly a passage from
an interpretation of thermodynamical entropy in terms
9of the probabilistic approach alone to an interpretation
of thermodynamical entropy as a hybrid mix of the prob-
abilistic and the algorithmic approaches.
V. ZUREK’S THEOREM ON MAXWELL’S
DEMONS IN QUANTUM THERMODYNAMICS
Bennett’s work on Maxwell’s demon has been general-
ized by Wojciech Hubert Zurek in many respects [6], [7],
[8], [38].
The first point analyzed by Zurek concerns the charac-
terization of the particular structural peculiarity of the
dynamical system (Xcompound , Hcompound) under which
the mix probabilistic + algorithmic approach underlying
Bennett’s Theorem may be applied:
up to this point we have assumed that Maxwell’s de-
mon acts on a particular molecule in a very particular
way: if the molecule arrives from the left side the demon
makes it to pass unaltered if and only if its velocity is
less or equal to a given threshold-velocity, acting in the
opposite way if the molecule arrives from the right side.
Such a behaviour of the demon, as it was first observed
by Leo Szilard in his basic 1929’s paper [39], appears as
a kind of intelligence.
While, taken too literally, Szilard’s paper was unfor-
tunately also the source of many confusionary specu-
lations concerning the contribution of the Subject (or
the Cartesian Cogito in more philosophically palatable
terms) to the Object’s thermodynamical entropy, some-
times appealing to the wrong claim that Subject’s mea-
surements are necessary thermodynamically-irreversible
processes (whose falsity, as we have seen, may be di-
rectly derived by Landauer’s Principle; in the quantum
case we are going to introduce, anyway, it was time be-
fore directly derived by Yakir Aharonov, Peter Bergmann
and Joel Lebowitz [40]), it had the great merit of intu-
itively suggesting the essential structural peculiarity of
Maxwell’s demon, allowing Zurek to generalize Bennett’s
Theorem starting from the following questions:
1. which is exactly the kind of intelligence showed by
Maxwell’s demon?
2. can Bennett’s Theorem to be generalized to sys-
tems having the same kind of intelligence?
Observing that, according to the way we characterized
it in the previous section, the structural peculiarity of
Xdemon and Hdemon is to give rise to a scattering cross-
section dσ
dΩ that, from the point of view of Algorithmic
Physics, corresponds to the prescribed algorithm of leav-
ing to pass or reflecting elastically a molecule according
to the value of a computed semaphore-binary predicate
p(s,v), one could think that Bennett’s Theorem might
be generalized to any situation in which Xdemon and
Hdemon give rise to a scattering cross-section
dσ
dΩ that,
from the point of view of Algorithmic Physics, corre-
sponds to an algorithm leaving to pass or reflecting elas-
tically a molecule according to a computed arbitrary bi-
nary predicate.
But one immediately realizes that such a generalization
is wrong in that not every chosen semaphore-function
corresponds to a resulting behaviour that seems to be
intelligent.
Indeed, Szilard tells us, the particular ”intelligence” of
the semaphore-predicate p derives from the fact that the
resulting algorithm performed by the demon acts on each
molecule in order of lowering the probabilistic informa-
tion of the gas: we are tempted to say that it acts in a
clever way exactly since his behaviour seems to be tele-
ological, finalized to the objective of taking the gas in a
more ordered state.
Let us observe, finally, that such an ordering-process
made by the demon acts necessarily out of thermodynam-
ical equilibrium, since its ”intelligence” is accomplished
precisely by creating a ”clever” disuniformity in the spa-
tial distribution of a thermodynamical variable (in this
case the temperature).
We are conseguentially led to the following generaliza-
tion of Bennett’s theorem:
the thermodynamical entropy of a classical many-body
system (Xm.b, Hm.b):
• preliminary prepared in a state of thermodynam-
ical equilibrium described, in Classical Statistical
Mechanics, by the statistical ensemble (Xm.b, Peq)
• in a second time made to interact with an other
physical system (Xint , Hint) that is intelligent:
may be expressed as:
Stherm(Peq) = Iprob(Peq) + Ialg(Peq) (5.1)
where Iprob(Peq) and Ialg(Peq) are, respectively, the
probabilistic information and the algorithmic informa-
tion of the ensemble (Xm.b, Peq), where the intelligence-
condition of (Xint , Hint) is defined in the following way:
1. the scattering cross-section dσ
dΩ , seen from the point
of view of Algorithmic Physics, corresponds to a de-
terministic algorithm f acting on a single molecule
2. in a way that takes the many-body system out of
thermodynamical equilibrium
3. reducing its probabilistic information
Such a definition of an intelligent system is, indeed,
a strenghtening of Gell-Mann’s notion of information
gathering and using system (IGUS) defined as a
complex adaptive system able to make observations
(cfr. [19] and the 12th section of [41]) that, contrary to
these notions difficult to formalize, has a precise mathe-
matical meaning.
A part from having generalized it to a strongly larger
class of intelligent systems, Zurek’s main extension of
Bennett’s work concerns its extension to the quantum
domain:
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Zurek’s theorem 4, the quantum analogue of Bennett’s
theorem, states that the thermodynamical entropy of a
quantum many-body system (Hm.b, Hˆm.b):
• preliminary prepared in a state of thermodynami-
cal equilibrium described, in Quantum Statistical
Mechanics, by the quantum statistical ensemble
(Hm.b, ρeq)
• in a second time made to interact with an other
physical system (Hint , Hˆint) that is intelligent:
may be expressed as:
Stherm(ρeq) = Iprob(ρeq) + Ialg(ρeq) (5.2)
where Iprob(ρeq) is the quantum probabilistic infomation
of the density operator ρeq, namely its Von Neumann’s
entropy:
Iprob(ρeq) := −Trρeq log ρeq (5.3)
while Ialg(ρeq) is the quantum algorithmic information
of the ensemble (Hm.b, ρeq) 5, namely:
I(ρeq) :=
{
min{|x| : U(x) = ρeq} if ∃x : U(x) = ρeq,
+∞ otherwise.
(5.4)
i.e. the length of the shortest program computing it
on the fixed Chaitin quantum universal computer U,
where the intelligence-condition of the quantum system
(Hint , Hˆint) is defined exactly as in the classical case
through the following conditions:
1. the scattering cross-section dσ
dΩ , seen from the point
of view of Algorithmic Physics, corresponds to an
algorithm f acting on a single molecule
2. in a way that takes the many-body system out of
thermodynamical equilibrium
4 I would like to advise the reader that my presentation of Zurek’s
theorem differs slightly from Zurek’s own ideas for which we
strongly demand to the previously cited original Zurek’s papers
5 Zurek claims that the assumption of the Church-Turing’s Thesis
eliminates any dependence from the particular universal com-
puter U adopted by (or better constituting) the demon. He, in
particular, claims that, by the Church-Turing’s Thesis, it doesn’t
matter if U is a classical computer or a quantum computer;
so he substantially claims that Quantum Algorithmic Informa-
tion Theory collapses to Classical Algorithmic information The-
ory, an arbitrary assumption for whose discussion I demand to
[10]. I will therefore assume, from here and beyond, that the
computer U in eq.5.4 is a Universal Quantum Computer. But
let then observe that, in this way, one implicitly assumes that
the quantum algorithmic information of a quantum state must
be defined in terms of classical-descriptions of such a state, as
claimed by Svozil [42] and Vitanyi [43], and not in terms of quan-
tum descriptions as it is claimed by Berthiaume, Van Dam and
Laplante [44], an issue, this one, about which I demand once
more to [10]
3. reducing its probabilistic information
It is important to remark, at this point, that such a defi-
nition of intelligence, applied in the quantum domain, is
indeed subtler, owing to the entanglement’s phenomenon
between the quantum many-body system (Hm.b, Hˆm.b)
and (Hint , Hˆint) having no classical analogue, that is
itself used by (Hint , Hˆint) as to realize its teleological
action.
VI. THE THERMODYNAMICAL COST OF
ERASING THE MEMBRANES’ MEMORY OF
PERES’ ENGINE
In the previous sections we have introduced all the in-
gredients required to present the contribution of this pa-
per, namely the confutation of the claim, presented by
Asher Peres in [9] as well as in the 9th chapter of his
wonderful book [1], that the Theorem of Indistinguisha-
bility for nonorthogonal states is necessary in order of
preserving the Second Law of Thermodynamics.
Peres’s argument is based on the assumption that the
thermodynamical-entropy of a quantum system is
described by Von Neumann’s entropy, assumption
that he deeply analyzes explicitly reporting the cele-
brated original calculus by which Von Neumann, in the
section5.2 of [45], computed the thermodynamical en-
tropy of a quantum mixture {pi , |φi >< φi|}ni=1 as if
each |φi >< φi| was a specie of ideal gas enclosed in
a large impenetrable box, and inferring that the ther-
modynamical mixing entropy of the different species is
Iprob(
∑
i pi|φi >< φi|).
Peres reviews Von Neumann’s procedure in the follow-
ing way:
”It also assumes the existence of semipermeable
membranes which can be used to perform quantum tests.
These membranes separate orthogonal states
with perfect efficency. The fundamental problem here
is whether it is legitimate to treat quantum states in
the same way as varieties of classical ideal gases. This
issue was clarified by Einstein in the early days of the
”old” quantum theory as follows: consider an ensemble
of quantum systems, each one enclosed in a large
impenetrable box, so as to prevent any interaction
between them. These boxes are enclosed in an even
larger container, where they behave as an ideal gas,
because each box is so massive that classical mechanics
is valid for its motion (· · · ). The container itself has
ideal walls and pistons which may be, according to our
needs, perfectly conducting, or perfectly insulating, or
with properties equivalent to those of semipermeable
membranes. The latter are endowed with
automatic devices able to peak inside the boxes
and to test the state of the quantum system enclosed
therein.” (from the section9.3 of [1])
There is a point, anyway, of this review in which, delib-
erately, Peres moves away from Von Neumann’s original
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treatment:
he doesn’t assume that the membranes separate
nonorthogonal states with perfect efficiency as, in-
stead, Von Neumann does:
”Each system s1, · · · , sn is confined in a box K1, · · · ,Kn
whose walls are impenetrable to all transmission
effects – which is possible for this system because of the
lack of interaction” (from the section5.2 of [45])
The reason why Peres, contrary to Von Neumann,
doesn’t make such an assumption is that, according to
him, this would imply a violation of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics; his argument is the following: if semi-
permeable membranes which unambiguously distinguish
non-orthogonal states were possible, one could use them
to realize the following cyclic thermodynamical transfor-
mation for a mixture of two species of 1-qubit’s states,
the |0 >< 0|-specie and the 12 (|0 > +|1 >)(< 0|+ < 1|)}-
specie, both with the same concentration 12
• in the initial state the two species occupy two cham-
bers with equal volumes, with the |0 >< 0|- specie
occupying the right-half of the left-half of the vessel
and the 12 (|0 > +|1 >)(< 0|+ < 1|)}- specie occu-
pying the left-half of the right-half of the vessel
• the first step of the process is an isothermal expan-
sion by which the |0 >< 0|- specie occupies all the
left-half of the vessel while the 12 (|0 > +|1 >)(<
0|+ < 1|)-specie occupies all the right-half of the
vessel; this expansion supplies an amount of work:
∆L1 = +nT ln 2 (6.1)
T being the temperature of the reservoir.
• at this stage the impenetrable partitions separating
the two species are replaced by the ”magic”-semi-
permeable membranes having the ability of distin-
guish non-orthogonal states; precisely one of them
is transparent to the |0 >< 0|-specie and reflect the
1
2 (|0 > +|1 >)(< 0|+ < 1|)}-specie while the other
membrane has the opposite properties; then, by a
double frictionless piston, it is possible to bring the
engine, without expenditure of work or heat trans-
fer, to a state in which all the two species occupy
with the same concentration only the left-hand of
the vessel, the right-hand of the vessel remaining
empty; we can represent mathematically the state
of affairs of the system by the following decompo-
sition:
E1 := {(1
2
, |0 >< 0|) , (1
2
,
1
2
(|0 > +|1 >)(< 0|+ < 1|))}
(6.2)
ρ :=
(
3
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
)
(6.3)
• since the state of the mixture-of-species is com-
pletelly determined by ρ, and not by a particular
its decomposition, to represent the actual state of
affairs by E or by the Schatten’s decomposition of
ρ:
E1 := {(ρ−, |e− >< e−|) , (ρ+, |e+ >< e+|)} (6.4)
ρ± :=
1
4
(2±
√
2) (6.5)
|e± > := (1±
√
2)(|0 > + |1 >) (6.6)
is absolutely equivalent
• let us now replace the two ”magic” membranes
with ordinary membranes able to distinguish only
orthogonal species; since the |e− >< e−|-specie
and the |e+ >< e−|-specie are orthogonal, the re-
versible diffusion of the two species separate them,
with the |e+ >< e+|-specie occupying the left-half
of the vessel and the |e− >< e−|-specie occupying
the right-half of the vessel.
• finally an isothermal compression takes the system
in a situation in which the volume and the pressure
are the same of the initial state; such a compression
requires an expenditure of work of:
∆L2 = −nT [ρ1 log ρ1 + ρ2 log ρ2] (6.7)
• finally a suitable unitary evolution takes the system
again in the initial state.
The net work made by the engine during the cycle is:
∆L = ∆L1 +∆L2 > 0 (6.8)
so that the whole thermodynamical cycle converts the
heat extracted by the reservoir in a positive amount of
work of ∆L.
This, according to Peres, violates the Second Principle,
proving that the ”magic” membranes able to sepa-
rate nonorthogonal states with perfect efficiency
cannot exist.
Such a proof, anyway, in not correct, owing to Zurek’s
theorem; the key point touches the conceptual deep-
ness underlying eq.5.2, whose complete comprehension
requires to explicitly analyze the bug in Von Neumann’s
proof that Stherm(ρ) = Iprob(ρ).
The key point is based in the own definition of
the semi-permeables membranes of Einstein’s method:
as correctly observed by Peres the semipermeable-
membranes are endowed with automatic devices
able to peak inside the boxes and to test the state.
What Peres seems unfortunately not to catch is that
a semi-permeable membrane is then an intelligent sys-
tem operating in the following way:
1. gets the input (s, i) from a device measuring both
the side s from which the |φi >< φi|-specie arrives
and its kind, i.e. the classical information codified
by its label i.
12
2. computes a certain semaphore-function p such that
(s, i)
p→ p[(s, i)] giving as output a 0 if the |φi ><
φi|-specie must be left to pass while gives as output
a one if the |φi >< φi|-specie must be stopped
3. gives the output p[(s,i)] to a suitable device that
operates on the |φi >< φi|-specie in the specified
way
The argument of Bennett’s exorcism concerning the ne-
cessity of taking into account the algorithmic-information
of the sequences of successive recorded (s, i)’s in the
membrane’s memory thus apply.
But this must be done, in particular, in the cases of
Peres’-engine:
taking into account also the algorithmic-information
of the semi-permeable’s membranes, one sees that it is
greater than or equal to the universe’s entropy decrease
corresponding to the work made by the engine, so that,
by eq.5.2:
∆Stherm ≥ 0 (6.9)
and Peres’ arguments falls down.
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